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In this article I wish to re-examine the vexed issue of the possibility of ideal-
ism in ancient and medieval philosophy with particular reference to the case
of Johannes Scottus Eriugena (c. 800–c. 877), the Irish Neoplatonic Chris-
tian philosopher. Both Bernard Williams and Myles Burnyeat have argued
that idealism never emerged (and for Burnyeat, could not have emerged) as
a genuine philosophical position in antiquity, a claim that has had wide
currency in recent years, and now constitutes something of an orthodoxy.1
Richard Sorabji (instancing Gregory of Nyssa) and Werner Beierwaltes
(citing Proclus and Eriugena), and Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson (discussing
Plotinus), on the other hand, have all argued that idealism is to be found in
the Neoplatonic tradition, a tradition neglected by Burnyeat.2 Similarly, in a
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1. Myles Burnyeat, “Idealism and Greek Philosophy: What Descartes Saw and
Berkeley Missed,” Philosophical Review 91 (1982): 3–40, repr. in Godfrey Vesey, ed.,
Idealism—Past and Present (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1982), pp. 19–50. Hereafter
this essay will be cited in the version printed in Vesey, ed.
2. Richard Sorabji, “Gregory of Nyssa: The Origins of Idealism,” in Time,
Creation and Continuum. Theories in Antiquity and the Early Middle Ages (London:
Duckworth, 1983), pp. 287–96; Werner Beierwaltes, Denken des Einen. Studien zur
neuplatonischen Philosophie and ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte (Frankfurt: Klostermann,
1985). See also Beierwaltes, “Die Wiederentdeckung des Eriugena im Deutschen
Idealismus,” in Platonismus  und  Idealismus (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1972), pp.
188–201, and his “Zur Wirkungsgeschichte Eriugenas im Deutschen Idealismus und
danach. Eine kurze, unsystematische Nachlese,” in Eriugena. Grundzüge seines
Denkens (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1994), pp. 313–330. Eyjólfur Kjalar Emilsson,
“Cognition and its Object,” in Lloyd P. Gerson, ed., The Cambridge Companion to
Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1996), pp. 217–49, esp. pp. 245–49. But see,
Lloyd P. Gerson, Plotinus (London: Routledge, 1994), p. 227, n.3, who maintains
that Plotinus is not an idealist.
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1989 study, I argued not only that idealism was a genuine possibility in late
classical and in medieval philosophy, but that that the ninth-century Carolin-
gian philosopher Johannes Eriugena presents a striking example of an ex-
tremely radical, almost fantastical, idealism.3 Of course, the whole discussion
depends entirely on what is meant by ‘idealism’. Burnyeat uses Berkeley’s
immaterialism as his standard for idealism, and it is this decision, coupled
with his failure to acknowledge the legacy of German idealism, which pre-
vents him from seeing the classical and medieval roots of idealism more
broadly understood.
Contrary to Burnyeat, I wish to argue that an idealism based on a
developed concept of subjectivity and a thinking through of the implica-
tions of divine immateriality was not only possible in the Middle Ages but
found actual and sophisticated expression in Johannes Scottus Eriugena.
Eriugena’s extreme intellectualist immaterialism differs from modern
idealism in that it is motivated not so much by epistemological consideration
of sceptical arguments concerning the existence of the external world, but
by theological consideration of the consequences of the doctrine of divine
creation. How is the relation of creation to creator to be understood?
Burnyeat charges that the Greek (including the Neoplatonic) concept of
creation always involved an imposition of form on matter (Vesey, p. 31),
whereas it seems to me that one of the most obvious concerns of the Greek
Patristic writers was to articulate a concept of creation which avoided the
form/matter paradigm. These Greek authors developed a new paradigm—
creation as self-expression or self-manifestation, creation as theophany. Simi-
larly, as we shall see, Eriugena, who mediates this Greek Christian tradition
in the Latin West, understands divine creation as a kind of self-creation,
itself understood as a kind of eternal self-intellection or self-thinking. God’s
first act is His self-constitution as manifest being, an act which coincides
with the overflowing or outgoing of the divine nature in the creation of all
things. God’s self-expression is also His self-manifestation in the world of
causes and effects, and this is understood by Eriugena to be a necessary part
of the divine unfolding. In the tradition of Eriugena, as later in Eckhart’s
Parisian Lectures, being understood as form is the product of a kind of
self-consciousness or self-reflection. The very nature of reality is ap-
proached through the paradigm of reflexive self-consciousness, often ex-
pressed in terms of the inner relations between the Persons of the Trinity,
and this is directly in line with the German Idealist tradition, specifically
Hegel.4 This Neoplatonic Christian idealism expressly emphasises the para-
digm of self-knowing or self-awareness as the founding, thetic, cosmic act.
God’s self-understanding is the prime mover in the creation of the universe,
3. Dermot Moran, The Philosophy of John Scottus Eriugena. A Study of Idealism in
the Middle Ages (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1989).
4. See Beierwaltes, “Das Problem des absoluten Selbstbewußtseins bei Johan-
nes Scotus Eriugena,” in Beierwaltes, ed., Platonismus in der Philosophie des Mittelalters
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1969), pp. 484–516.
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and in this sense, intellection precedes being. The result is a system far
removed from the supposed realism of the ancients.
MYLES BURNYEAT’S OBJECTION
In his influential article, first published in 1982 in Philosophical Review, Myles
Burnyeat has argued that
Idealism, whether we mean by that Berkeley’s own doctrine that esse est
percipi or a more vaguely conceived thesis to the effect that everything
is in some substantial sense mental or spiritual, is one of the very few
major philosophical positions which did not receive its first formulation
in antiquity. (Vesey, p. 19)
In support of this claim Burnyeat cites Bernard Williams’s survey article
reviewing the Greek contribution to philosophy, which likewise asserts that
idealism, understood as “the monism of mind, which holds that nothing
ultimately exists except minds and their experiences” was not found in the
ancient world.5 For Burnyeat, all classical Greek philosophy was primarily
realist: the Greeks had an unquestioned, “inbuilt assumption of realism”
(Vesey, p. 33). With the possible exception of Gorgias, all ancient Greek
philosophers supposedly agreed that
[t]here is a reality of some sort confronting us; we are in touch with
something, even if this something, reality, is not at all what we think it
to be. Greek philosophy does not know the problem of proving in a
general way the existence of an external world. That problem is a
modern invention. (Vesey, pp. 32–33)
In particular Burnyeat rejects the view that Platonism is an idealism,
and he maintains that George Berkeley was both anachronistic and “utterly
mistaken” when, in his late work Siris §311 (1744), he interpreted Plato, on
the strength of a passage in Theaetetus 160b, as an idealist who denied, in
Berkeley’s own words, “an absolute actual existence of sensible or corporeal
things” (Vesey, pp. 19–20).6 Burnyeat agues against Berkeley that Plato is
5. Bernard Williams, “Philosophy,” in M. I. Finley, ed., The Legacy of Greece. A
New Appraisal (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 204–5. Burnyeat acknowledges
Williams’s influence, Vesey, p. 19, n.1.
6. For a discussion of Berkeley’s Siris in relation to Plotinus, see N. Baladi,
“Plotin et Berkeley: Témoignage de la Siris,” Revue Internationale de Philosophie 91
(1970): 338–47, and “Plotin et l’immatérialisme de Berkeley: Témoignage de la
Siris,” in Atti del Convegno internazionale sul tema Plotino e il Neoplatonismo in Oriente e
in Occidente (Rome: Ateneo Press 1974), pp. 597–604.
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not presenting his own views in the passage but is merely offering a reductio
ad absurdum of the view that perception is knowledge.
Burnyeat’s article, though provocative and richly suggestive, is prob-
lematic in many ways. In particular, his frame of reference is limited and his
conclusion is overstated. Part of Burnyeat’s problem is that he assumes that
realist and idealist are oppositional terms. While Burnyeat is undoubtedly
correct that the ancients, by and large, were realists in the sense that they
did not repudiate the existence of external things, nevertheless, their pecu-
liar kind of realism is not necessarily opposed to idealism, if by idealism we
understand a thesis about the nature of the really existing world rather than
as a kind of scepticism about the external world, which seems to be
Burnyeat’s interpretation. Ancient philosphy—and especially Platonism in
its various forms—is quite compatible with an idealism that denies the
independent existence of material objects, or argues that all objects are, in
some sense, entities produced by mind. Indeed, Plato is both an extreme
realist in holding the extra-mental existence of the Forms, and—at the very
same time—an immaterialist and intellectualist about the true nature of ta
onta. For Plato, the being of these Forms, though intelligible through and
through, is  still  independent of their being known, a position which  is
modified in Plotinus and his Neoplatonic successors, so that their being is
constituted by their being intelligized. For Plato, furthermore, physical
things which belong to the realm of becoming (genesis), while not consid-
ered to be wholly non-existent, are not completely real, since they incorpo-
rate changing matter in their composition, and belong to the realm of
ceaseless mutability.
CONCEPTS OF IDEALISM
Burnyeat’s frame of reference is limited in that he has a rather Anglocen-
tric conception of idealism. He assumes that idealism as such is best exem-
plified by Berkeley’s immaterialism. But ‘idealism’ is not a univocal term,
and there is no reason to assume that Berkeleian immaterialism represents
the modern paradigm. Berkeley, moreover, did not style himself as an
‘idealist’, but referred to his theory as immaterialism. Regrettably, Burnyeat
does not consider the complex forms of idealism presented by other mod-
ern philosophers who self-consciously embraced idealism, namely, Kant,
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. Several varieties of idealism are classified and
discussed by Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason B274–275, who characterizes
Descartes as a ‘problematical’ idealist and Berkeley as a ‘dogmatic idealist’.
For Kant, both are varieties of what he calls  ‘material idealism’—“the
theory which declares the existence of objects in space outside us to be
merely doubtful and indemonstrable or to be false and impossible”
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(B274).7 Kant dismissed Berkeley’s immaterialism as a subjective or dogmatic
idealism which inevitably resulted from attempting to understand space
and time as things in themselves.8 In place of subjective idealism (which
is really a kind of naïve realism) Kant offered his critical or transcendental
idealism. Kant then is, to a certain extent, agreeing with Burnyeat in seeing
the essence of this kind of idealism as connected with the conception of
spatial properties as belonging to things as they are in themselves. But
Kant’s transcendental idealism is a corrective to this view, and sees spatial
properties as belonging to things as they appear. Kant maintains that tran-
scendental idealism is the only view which does not treat the existence of
external material objects as problematical and arrived at by inference, but
treats them as immediately given in intuition (A369–372).
Furthermore, post-Kantian idealism places a huge emphasis on self-
consciousness as the condition for all knowledge. Both Schelling and
Hegel, reacting to Kant’s continuing dualism of subject and thing in itself,
developed a deeper understanding of idealism as involving the resolution
of all things into infinite consciousness, which is at the same time self-con-
sciousness. Substance is resolved into subjectivity. Being that has come to
knowledge of itself in self-consciousness and is at one with itself is at the very
heart of Hegelian idealism.9 Instead of using Berkeley’s ‘immaterialism’ as
our paradigm of idealism, could we not apply, for example, Hegel’s crite-
rion of idealism, as expressed in the Science of Logic, namely, that finite reality
requires the infinite for its intelligibility and completion.10 The recognition
that the finite requires completion by the infinite is more appropriate for
the philosophies of Neoplatonism than Berkeleian immaterialism.11 Thus
7. Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1965). See also the Fourth Paralogism A368–69.
8. In The Critique of Pure Reason, A368ff, Kant distinguished between empirical
and transcendental idealism. Empirical idealism is the doctrine which “denies the
existence of external objects of the senses” (A368), and transcendental idealism
holds that all appearances are representations and not things in themselves. Tran-
scendental idealism is an empirical realism (A371). Empirical idealists on the other
hand are transcendental realists who interpret appearances as things in themselves
(A369; A372). Dogmatic idealism is the rejection of matter (A377) and is applied
to Berkeley at B274 (as opposed to Descartes’s ‘problematic idealism’). Transcen-
dental realism treats space and time as things in themselves and inevitably leads to
Berkeley’s idealism (B 71; B274–75). In the appendix to the Prolegomena to Any
Future Metaphysics, trans. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1950), p.
123, Kant maintains that Berkeley holds that “all knowledge through the senses and
experience in nothing but sheer illusion, and only in the ideas of pure under-
standing and reason is there truth.”
9. See Robert B. Pippin, Hegel’s Idealism. The Satisfaction of Self-Consciousness
(New York: Cambridge U.P., 1989), pp. 163–74.
10. See G. W. F, Hegel, Science of Logic, chap. 2, Remark “Idealism,” trans. A. V.
Miller (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1989), pp. 154–56.
11. Hegel saw Proclus as a genuine precursor. Schelling, on the other hand,
distanced himself from the idealism of the Neoplatonists.
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Eriugena, as a Platonist and a Christian, considers the finite, material,
spatio-temporal world (including the human body) to be incomplete and
inadequate in terms of being. True reality is infinite, unbounded, anarchic,
endless, incomprehensible, and yet it becomes finite, bounded, principled,
and comprehensible. Eriugena is searching for ways to articulate this insight
that reality is an infinite whole in which both Creator and creation are
implicated and enfolded, and he enthusiastically adopts the Pseudo-
Dionysian strategy of using affirmations and negations to assert the dialec-
tical nature of the relations within this whole. Indeed, this understanding
of the self-development and coming to self-consciousness of the first princi-
ple is, I argue, at the very core of Neoplatonic thought. Hegel and his
followers recognized the Neoplatonists as their legitimate forebearers in
this regard.12 In particular, the Hegelian theologian Ferdinand Christian
Baur recognized Eriugena as holding a doctrine which is equally central to
German Idealism, namely that what God is, man also is namely “the abso-
lute consciousness of absolute being [Das absolute Bewußtseyn des absoluten
Seyns].”13
THE MOTIVATION FOR IDEALISM: NOT SCEPTICISM
BUT UNDERSTANDING CREATION
To argue, as Burnyeat does, that idealism based on radical scepticism was
not possible in the ancient world precisely because such radical scepticism
about the very existence of an external world was absent from ancient
philosophy (Vesey, pp. 32–33), does not exclude the possibility that other
kinds of idealism  were possible among the ancients,  even if  we grant
Burnyeat’s by no means uncontroversial thesis concerning the absence of
radical world-threatening doubt in ancient scepticism. Although Berkeley
understood his immaterialism as a return to commonsense realism and a
rebuttal of scepticism, other motivations for idealism are also possible. For
instance, Burnyeat entirely overlooks religious or theological motivations
towards idealism. Gregory of Nyssa and Eriugena both consider the true
nature of the created world to be immaterial, which for them is a direct
consequence of the divine creation. The act of creation is understood by
12. See Hegel’s Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 3 Vols., trans. E. S. Haldane
and Frances H. Simson, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 2:399–453,
where he sees the Alexandrian identification of self-consciousness and being as
paving the way for absolute idealism. See also Werner Beierwaltes, Platonismus und
Idealismus (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1972) and J.-L. Viellard-Baron, Platon
et l’idéalisme allemand (1770–1830) (Paris: Beauchesne, 1979).
13. F. C. Baur, Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes
(Tübingen, 1842), II, p. 285, quoted in Beierwaltes, Eriugena. Grundzüge seines
Denkens, p. 317.
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both Gregory and Eriugena to be an exemplification of the principle that
like produces like. Gregory, and subsequently Eriugena, postulate the imma-
teriality of reality in order to preserve the integrity of creatio ex nihilo. If the
world is to emerge from nothingness without matter, and if God is the only
cause, and the effect is like its cause, then the created cosmos must be
immaterial. God is immaterial and eternal, and the created world is also in
essence immaterial and eternal. Furthermore, since the universe is a prod-
uct of a personal God, true being is at least mind. The created world is
somehow enclosed within soul and mind. God’s transcendence about mat-
ter and His self-unity are understood as having the unity and immateriality
of mind in Eriugena’s conception. Although ultimate reality is more than
mind, that is not to say that it has abandoned mind, but that its intellectual
essence is so united in itself and in its being as to be beyond comprehension
not only by us but by God Himself.
IDEALISM UNDERSTOOD AS MONISM
Let us examine Burnyeat’s argument a little more closely. Central to his
(and to Bernard Williams’s) approach is the view that idealism is a monism:
I take it that if the label ‘idealist’ is of any historical use at all, it indicates
a form of monism: monism not about the number of things in exis-
tence but about the number of kinds of things. Just as materialism is
the monism which asserts that ultimately nothing exists or is real but
matter and material things, so idealism is the monism which claims that
ultimately all there is is mind and the contents of mind.14 (Vesey, p. 23)
Williams and Burnyeat both see Greek philosophy as caught in a struggle
between pluralism and monism. Both believe, furthermore, that the only
monism available to the Greek mind was materialism. As Burnyeat says, “a
monism leaning in the other direction, from reality to mind, would be
repellent to Greek thought, for it would seem to deprive mind of the objects
it must necessarily have” (Vesey, p. 33). These remarks should at best be
restricted to Greek pagan thought, since Greek Christian thought certainly
leads in the opposite direction, although, I must admit, I have difficulties
seeing how the Platonic tradition fits into Burnyeat’s scheme. Burnyeat him-
14. Burnyeat claims further (Vesey, p. 33) that the natural monism for the
Greeks was materialism. This is certainly true for the Stoics whom Burnyeat men-
tions but also for Augustine as illustrated in the Confessions, where he admits to
difficulty in conceiving an immaterial God. The point is true of the pre-Socratics
too, in the main, but surely Plato in this as in much else went strongly against the
current of the age. Burnyeat’s citing of Plato’s Parmenides here needs further
discussion.
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self argues that Plato and Plotinus cannot be idealists, since they are not strict
monists in that they retain an irreducible and alien matter in their cosmolo-
gies. However, matter is undoubtedly a product of the One for Plotinus.
Burnyeat also claims that the Greeks, including the Neoplatonists, could not
help thinking of creation as the imposition of form on a pre-existing matter,
and that matter is ineliminable even for Plotinus. Burnyeat concludes:
It seems, therefore, that the grand cosmic metaphor of emanation is
evidence less of incipient idealism in a modern sense than of the
ancients’ final inability to relinquish the traditional dualities of mind
and object, subject and attribute. (Vesey, p. 31)
But this seems excessive. After all, the usual opposite of idealism is material-
ism, it too is a monism but it often is qualified to be matter plus the number
series. Monisms need not be strict. Indeed, Aristotle argued that successful
explanation required at least two principles. It is not monism per se which is
sought but the priority of the explanatory principles invoked.
Is idealism necessarily a monism? And, if so, what kind of monism is at
stake here? Like the term ‘idealism’ and indeed most umbrella terms in
philosophy, the label ‘monism’ is capable of a multiplicity of meanings.
Burnyeat’s paradigm of monism is, perhaps, though this is not clearly
stated, atomism or Stoic materialism. But both classical and modern forms
of idealism see idealism as a way of expressing unity-in-plurality, for exam-
ple, the kind of unity that holds between mind and the objects of its
knowledge. On this account, idealism seeks to overcome the dualisms of
matter and spirit, subject and object, God and created nature. Thus, both
Hegel and Hölderlin, early in their philosophical careers, adopted the
ancient slogan ‘hen kai pan’ to articulate a unity-in-difference which includes
a sense of dialectical  cosmic process (the proodos and epistrophe of the
Neoplatonists). Neoplatonic and German Idealist monists conceived of an
absolute Oneness, but also required a principle of the internal differentia-
tion  of this unity.  Werner Beierwaltes  even claims that  the  notions  of
otherness, difference, and alterity are central Neoplatonic notions and
hence construes Neoplatonism as ‘thinking the one’, but not as a static non-
dialectical monism.15 Contra Burnyeat, then, there is no compelling reason
to assume that monism is central to the definition of idealism.
IDEALISM AS ‘MIND DEPENDENCE’
Besides postulating that idealism must be a monism, Burnyeat goes on to
characterize it in terms of a certain epistemological position, namely, that
15. Beierwaltes, Denken des Einen. Studien zur neuplatonischen Philosophie und
ihrer Wirkungsgeschichte (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 1985).
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the objects in the world, and the world itself, is in a certain very specific
sense, mind dependent. For Burnyeat, following Williams, mind dependence
presupposes some kind of gulf or separation between mind and reality, a
separation only conceivable in the light of a radical sceptical attack on the
mind’s ability to acquire genuine knowledge. Radical scepticism concern-
ing the external world and the implied separation of mind and its object
first appeared in the seventeenth century with Descartes, and not only did
not but could not have occurred in the Middle Ages or in antiquity. Burnyeat
contends that no ancient sceptic could have entertained the radical or
hyperbolic doubt of Descartes (that is, the possibility of total delusion
inspired by the evil demon and the possibility of the non-existence of the
world as such). Furthermore, Burnyeat contends, in a puzzling claim to
which we will return, that the human body for the ancients had not yet
become a part of the external world and thus conceiving of mind alone as
the principle of external things was impossible.
Central to Burnyeat’s argument is the assumption that an articulation
of the concept of mind dependence presupposes a developed conception
of subjectivity, which he believes was unavailable to philosophers before
Descartes. Burnyeat endorses the widespread view that the medievals did
not have a concept of consciousness and self-consciousness in the modern
private, internal sense. Descartes is usually credited with introducing this
concept into philosophy. However, I contend that a rich appreciation of
subjectivity is clearly evident in the Middle Ages, in the personal voice of the
poet and the autobiographer (witness Patrick’s Confessio), and in the appre-
ciation of the plurality of perspectives, irreducible singularities, such as are
beautifully expressed by Eriugena when he borrows the traditional imagery
of the many eyes fixed on the one golden tower, or the several interpreta-
tions of a single text of Scripture. Subjectivity here means a viewpoint, a
perspective. Furthermore, once this recognition of irreducible subjectivity
and perspectival multiplicity is combined with Greek intellectualism (the
primacy of theoria) and Christian personalism, a vision emerges which is
thoroughly idealist.
AUGUSTINE AND THE ORIGINS OF
MEDIEVAL SUBJECTIVITY
I cannot trace here the transformations of the conception of subjectivity in
medieval philosophy, but surely any serious reading of Augustine will un-
cover not just the powerful sense of interiority and privacy in the Confessions,
not just the inner dialogue of a man with himself (for example, “my inner
self was a house divided against itself,” Conf. VIII.8), but also the novel and
philosophically interesting notion of the will divided against itself, of the
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difficulty of willing to will (Conf. VIII.9), a discussion which displays a
sophisticated understanding of the reflexivity of purely mental acts.16 As
Charles Taylor has said, “[I]t is hardly an exaggeration to say that it was
Augustine who introduced the inwardness of radical reflexivity and be-
queathed it to the Western tradition of thought.”17
As is also well known, Augustine makes use of versions of the cogito very
frequently in his writings, and it is now a commonplace of scholarship that
Descartes’s works show a heavy reliance on various Augustinian formula-
tions of the cogito.18 Indeed, Augustine’s use of the cogito was drawn to
Descartes’s attention immediately after the publication of the Discourse of
1637. Similarly, in 1648, Arnaud pointed out to Descartes that a cogito in the
form of ‘si enim fallor sum,’ and indeed several other formulations, are to be
found in Augustine.19 Descartes denied Augustine’s direct influence, and
while pleased that an ancient authority confirmed his own discovery, always
protested that, in using it to respond to scepticism, he was putting this
discovery to a different use than Augustine. But several of Augustine’s
formulations of the cogito are expressly invoked to answer the sceptical
(Academical) charge that there is no certain knowledge about anything. As
in Descartes, Augustine sees the very recognition that one is doubting as
leading to the indubitable truth that one is doubting.20 Burnyeat discounts
Augustine’s role in the formulation of the kind of subjectivity required for
idealism, on the grounds that the truth of the cogito in Augustine is given
no special importance and is only one among many refutations of scepti-
cism, and is not used to explore interiority (Vesey, p. 44). But Augustine
used his cogito to establish the immateriality of mind in De libero arbitrio, and
to prove that the soul is an incorporeal substance in De quantitate animae and
in the Confessions. Furthermore, Augustine regarded the cogito as central to
16. Augustine, Confessions, trans. R.S. Pine-Coffin (Harmondsworth: Penguin
Classics, 1961), p. 170.
17. Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1989), p.
131.
18. E. Gilson, Etudes sur le rôle de la pensée médiévale dans la formation du système
cartésien (1930; repr. Paris: Vrin, 1951), pp. 191–201. See also Léon Blanchet, Les
Antécedents historiques du je pense donc je suis (1920; repr. Paris: Vrin, 1985). Gaunilo
has a version of the cogito for example, in reply to Anselm.
19. Augustine gives versions of the cogito in the Confessions XIII.11; City of God
XI.26, De libero arbitrio II.3.7; Contra Academicos III.xi.26, De Trinitate X.10.14 (si dubitat,
vivit); De Trin. XV.12.21; De vera religione XXXIX.73; Soliloquia II.i.i. See also, De diversis
quaestionibus where Augustine argues that mind has immediate self-knowledge. See
G. B. Mathews, “Si fallor, sum,” in R. A. Markus, ed., Augustine. A Collection of Critical
Essays (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 151–64, for the view that the cogito
in Augustine is primarily negative in intent—aiming to refute Academic objections.
20. Burnyeat argued that Augustine’s cogito was not used against extreme
scepticism of our subjective states, but see De Trinitate XV.12.21, and R. Sorabji,
Time, Creation and Continuum, p. 289. See also J. M. Rist, Augustine. Ancient Thought
Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P., 1994), pp. 63–67.
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explicating the self-grounding nature of the self. In De Trinitate, for exam-
ple, this self-presence is a sign that humans are made in the image of God,
whose divinity requires immediate self-presence.
But there is much more to Augustine’s understanding of subjectivity
than is revealed in his discussion of the cogito. Indeed, it would be wrong to
isolate  the cogito from Augustine’s  more theological reflections on  the
nature of the relation between God and His Word, or the interrelation of
the Persons of the Trinity, which is frequently explicated in terms of the
model of a kind of intellectual self-understanding. Augustine blends the
theology of the Word with Plotinus’s discussion of self-knowledge in Ennead
V.3 to produce a complex and developmental account of different types of
self-knowledge (notitia sui; intelligentia sui; cogitatio sui), both implicit and
explicit, involving the moment of intellectual understanding or insight, the
verbum interius or verbum mentis (De Trin. IX.6.9),21 later developed by Aqui-
nas.22 Burnyeat, in his discussion of medieval subjectivity, does not treat
explicity of Augustine’s cogitatio sui, but he does allow for an awareness of
“unambiguously subjective states” in Augustine (Vesey, p. 40). He denies,
however, that Augustine privileged these subjective states as Descartes did.
Burnyeat concludes:
Whatever hints Augustine may have furnished, it was Descartes who put
subjective knowledge at the center of epistemology—and thereby made
idealism a possible position for a modern philosopher to take. (Vesey,
p. 44)
This is surely an exaggeration. Augustine furnished more than hints—
he laid the foundation, and indeed set the parameters, for the considera-
tion  of self-knowledge in medieval thought. Thus, De Trinitate book  X
specificaly addresses the centrality of self-knowledge as the turning point for
the conversion of the soul. Self-knowledge is based on an intellectual act
that is transparent to itself, and requires no sensible imagining, no interme-
diary, no intervention of the phantasm. In Augustine’s language, the mind
knows itself and circumscribes itself. The act of self-knowing in Augustine
is an intrinsically limiting act, a self-enclosing which allows one to appreci-
ate the nature of other less finite subjectivities. Self-enclosure, self-gather-
ing, is the first step towards self-transcendence.
According to Augustine the mind knows itself with an infallible cer-
titude, and this certitude gives the mind its definition, its delimitation. In
De diversis quaestionibus Q.15, Augustine confirms (in a passage which Eri-
21. In De Trinitate book IX.11.16, Augustine identifies notitia with the verbum
mentis, see n.17 “La notitia connaissance actuelle ou habituelle de l’âme par elle-
même?” in P. Agaësse and J. Moingt, La Trinité (Livres VIII–XV). Deuxième partie: les
images, Oeuvres de Saint Augustin 16 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955), pp. 591–93.
22. See Sorabji, Time, Creation and Continuum, p. 289.
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ugena will quote) that the mind which knows itself, comprehends or cir-
cumscribes itself and is therefore finite. Furthermore, in De Trinitate
IX.12.18, a text upon which Eriugena will rely, Augustine says that the
mind ‘gives birth’ (gignit) to the knowledge of itself (notitia sui), a knowl-
edge which is ‘equal to itself’. Borrowing from Plotinus, Augustine estab-
lishes as principal that the thing known ‘co-engenders’ (congenerat) the
knowledge of it in the knower (De Trin. IX.12.18). When the mind con-
templates an object, the act of knowing and the thing known together unite
to produce the knowledge. But when the soul knows itself, there is no object
outside itself, and hence it alone engenders the knowledge of itself, since
it is both knower and known.23 Moreover, the soul is knowable to itself
before it actually knows itself, and when it actually knows itself, then it
begets (gignit) the knowledge of itself from itself. In De Trinitate book X,
Augustine asserts that to know an object is to know, and to know is to
know that one knows, hence knowledge implies self-knowledge. Further-
more, the soul never ceases to know itself in a certain sense, though it can
be wrong about its nature (and, for example, think that it is corporeal,
when it is really incorporeal).24 Augustine distinguishes between an im-
plicit knowledge (nosse) of oneself and the explicit cogitatio of the self. For
Augustine cogitatio is a reunifying act whereby the soul gathers itself to
itself. This dynamic account of human self-knowing is itself used to under-
stand the divine self-knowledge, which, however, itself is ontologically prior.
In Augustine, as in Plotinus, the divine self-intellection is productive of
the human  self-knowledge which mirrors it. Augustine’s conception of
subjectivity must be understood in terms of the divine model, but either
way, it is a richly developed conception of subjectivity.
Before moving from Augustine, besides his development of self-con-
sciousness and subjectivity, it is worth mentioning an idealist trait in his
philosophy. Plotinus, Basil, Augustine in Confessions book XI, and Scottus
Eriugena, for example, are all idealists about the nature of time.25 For
Augustine, time is distentio animi. Time exists only in the mind; it is mind-
dependent. Elsewhere, Augustine ranks the ideas of things in the mind
higher than the things themselves. Putting these strands together, Augus-
tine may be said to be giving an account of mind as governing the material
realm in a Neoplatonic manner. The mind possesses interiority and subjec-
tivity, which mark out human nature as the image of the Trinity. Discovery
of self-innerness helps to disclose the God within, the God who is present
in memoria. The soul is the site of the divine presence in the world. What
23. “Itaque mens cum se ipsam cognoscit, sola parens est notitiae suae: et cognitum enim
et cognitor ipsa est,” De Trinitate IX.12.18. Here, Augustine is relying heavily on
Plotinus’s tractate, Ennead V.3.
24. There are clear parallels here with Descartes’s argument that the cogito
gives us knowledge that we are thinking, immaterial beings.
25. See Sorabji, Time, Creation and Continuum, pp. 29–32, where Sorabji con-
centrates on the idealism inherent in Augustine’s account of time.
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more central place could the account of subjectivity have in Augustine? It
is clear, then, that Christian thought in the post-classical period had already
developed a rich concept of subjectivity.
THE DENIAL OF MATTER IN CLASSICAL PHILOSOPHY
We have just been discussing subjectivity. Let us now briefly examine its
counterpart—the conception of external reality in classical thought. For
Burnyeat, as for many philosophers, conceiving of the notion of an external
world requires conceiving of a inner world of consciousness, so in a sense
realism as well as idealism only explicitly came into view in modern philoso-
phy (the ancients simply had an “unquestioned and unquestioning assump-
tion of realism,” Vesey, p. 44). In other words, a developed sense of subjectivity
is a precondition for conceiving of the very notion of an extra-mental reality
(and idealism is the denial of that reality). Burnyeat thinks the ancient
Greeks did not have a conception of extra-mental reality in the appropriate
modern sense. But, as Richard Sorabji has shown, a denial of the extra-
mental existence of matter certainly does occur in the writings of Greek
Christian Neoplatonists, for example, Gregory of Nyssa, John Philoponus,
and Basil, who develop Plotinus’s conception of material things as actually
immaterial substances (ousiai) surrounded by immaterial properties, which,
when mingled together, give the appearance of materiality and corporeal-
ity.26 Corporeality and materiality are consequences of the fallen human
perspective on reality. Humans treat the incorporeal qualities of things as if
they were actual physical extra-mental properties.
Burnyeat might object that the analysis of things into bundles of prop-
erties is not in itself a sufficient mark of idealism. David Hume, for instance,
holds a bundle view about substances but is not an idealist.27 However, both
Gregory of Nyssa, in the fourth century, and his ninth-century translator
and admirer, Johannes Eriugena, hold not just that things are bundles of
properties, but that these properties are in themselves immaterial and
incorporeal, and are located in the mind and are grouped around (circa)
substances which are also thought of as immaterial. It is less clear that these
authors thought of the essences (ousiai) of things as existing only in the
perceiving mind (they are certainly located in the divine mind), but all
ousiai are incorporeal and immaterial, and ultimately are nothing other
than the unchanging ideas or archetypes in the divine mind. For both
26. Sorabji, Time, Creation and Continuum, pp. 287–96. See also, Sorabji, Matter,
Space and Motion. Theories in Antiquity and Their Sequel (London: Duckworth, 1988),
pp. 54–56. Sorabji cites Augustine’s use of the cogito in De Trinitate XV.12.21 as
explicitly refutative of scepticism.
27. Myles Burnyeat has made that point to me in conversation.
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Gregory and Eriugena, there are only minds (divine and human) and their
modifications. Properties are immaterial and dependent features of the
world, in this case, dependent on minds. Here we have evidence of idealism
not just in the sense of mind dependence but in terms of the very denial of
extra-mental material substances characteristic of Berkeley.
NEOPLATONIC IDEALISM: THE PROBLEM OF PLOTINUS
Burnyeat’s  refusal  to  acknowledge the  existence  of  ancient idealism is
explained, in part, by his being out of sympathy with Neoplatonism. As he
himself admits, he finds later Greek philosophy, especially Neoplatonism,
to be somewhat less than “congenial” (Vesey, p. 32). For Burnyeat, Neo-
platonism is not properly an idealism not only because of its unresolved
dualism, but also because it is not clear that the Neoplatonists see the
highest principle as mind. Indeed, Neoplatonists such as Plotinus hold that
the One (to hen) is prior to Mind, and it is unclear whether Plotinus’s One
can be characterised as mind-like in any way.28 As Burnyeat comments: “A
full treatment of Neoplatonic ‘idealism’ would have to grapple with the
further difficulty that Intellect and Soul themselves proceed from an in-
effable first principle, the One” (Vesey, p. 31). The precise meanings of
Mind (nous) and its activities (dianoia, noesis, katanoesis), within the Neopla-
tonic scheme, are not well understood. There is, however, evidence that
the One is at least mind-like in some way. Recently, a number of studies
have tried to tease out Plotinus’s concept of knowing.29 Although Plotinus
says explicitly many times that the One does not think (Enn. III.9.9; V.3.13;
V.4.2), and that it is “before thought” (pro tou noesai; pro noeseos, V.3.10),
it is arguable that the One has some kind of self-knowing, some kind of
direct contact with itself (he uses a term from Epicurus, epibole at Enn.
VI.7.3.8–9).
28. Burnyeat comments: “They [The Neoplatonists] have been classified as
idealists because they hold that the world proceeds from Intellect (Nous) and Soul.
The problem is that whether this is in any interesting sense an idealist view depends
on how the cosmic creation is conceived, and about that, as about much else,
Plotinus and his successors are notoriously obscure. Berkeley was content to cite
evidence that ‘the Platonists’ believe that all nature is alive, and is made and
governed by an eternal mind. But that is hardly enough. Even if it can be said that
in Neoplatonism the real, in so far as it is real, is in some sense spiritual, it remains
that matter is not” (Vesey, p. 30).
29. See especially Eyjólfur Emilsson, Plotinus on Sense-Perception: A Philosophical
Study (Cambridge: Cambridge U.P. 1988), and John Dillon, “Plotinus, the First
Cartesian?,” Hermathena 149 (1990): pp. 19–32. See also Sorabji, “Myths about
Non-Propositional Thought,” in Time, Creation and Continuum, pp. 137–56, who
argues that the contact with the One cannot be construed as a form of thought
(p. 155).
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It can be argued that there is in the One a form of thinking above
dianoia and noesis. Rist argues that Plotinus’s denial of thinking in the One
only means that the One does not think as we do. There are some passages
where Plotinus appears to indicate that the One has a kind of thinking
though not of a kind which indicates a doubling of thinker and thought.
The One has a kind of self-intellection, ‘hyper-thinking’ or ‘supra-Intellec-
tion’, hypernoesis (Enn. VI.8.16; katanoesis, Enn. V.4.2), and even Burnyeat
concedes that “[i]t is possible that the One does in some obscure and
unfamiliar sense have knowledge of itself” (Vesey, p. 31). But he does not
think this admission leads to the conclusion that Plotinus is an idealist
because he adds two further qualifications: (1) the ultimate monism at the
level of the One does not rule out that “some form of duality remains at
every other level” (Vesey, p. 31) and (2) that since the One is higher than
and somehow absorbs Nous in itself, it would be misleading to call the
monism of the One a “monism of mind” (Vesey, p. 32). Burnyeat’s argu-
ment falls if we remove from idealism the requirement that it be a strict
Parmenidean type of monism. Idealism requires (even on Burnyeat’s first
general  definition)  that  everything be ultimately explicable in terms of
mind, this type of monism does not require that all levels of reality collapse
into mind tout court. For Plotinus, all reality telescopes into the One, in the
sense that from the point of view of the One all is one, but the emanation
(proodos) is undeniably also real and even eternal. All we need for idealism
is that all reality be generated by a process which is best understood in terms
of self-generating self-consciousness, and hence that all things are mind
dependent but not necessarily that they have no existence whatsoever.
There are, as it were, varieties of mind dependence, and varieties of what it
is to be mind, at least in the Neoplatonic tradition. The crucial point is that
Plotinian idealism thinks of the highest unity in terms of complete self-
coincidence, for which self-conscious intellection is the closest available
model. In the One, the self-intellection of Nous turns completely into
Being.  That self-knowing  is a  kind of  being is the very kernel of  this
idealism.
Burnyeat also claims that postulating the One as the highest principle
means that absolute priority cannot be given to mind. This is countered by
the Plotinian recognition of the role of the human mind in the return, in
henosis. Burnyeat fails to take into account that for Plotinus the human soul
possesses within it a spark or ingredient which in fact belongs with the One
and is never completely separated from it. The human mind, therefore, can
range through the hierarchies of reality up to the highest, the One; and the
One is able to accommodate within it in some inexplicable manner the
highest intellects of all humans. Becoming one with the one does not signify
a complete destruction or annihilation of the self as in Buddhism, but
rather a form of self-purification and self-expansion whereby all limitations
to self-knowledge are removed and the self spirals into an infinite cycle of
self-knowing and self-unifying so that it becomes inseparable from the One
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which is its inner principle of self-unification. The boundaries between self
and One are overcome.
IDEALIST ASPECTS IN ERIUGENA’S PERIPHYSEON
I shall concentrate in the remainder of this essay on Johannes Scottus
Eriugena and specifically on his major work, the dialogue Periphyseon (c.
867), more usually, but inaccurately, known under the title De divisione
naturae (On the Division of Nature).30 The setting for Eriugena’s idealism is a
Platonism received indirectly through the Church Fathers, both Greek and
Latin, through the Latin encyclopedist tradition (including Macrobius and
Martianus Capella), as well as through Calcidius’s commentary on the
Timaeus. Eriugena is a committed Platonist with regard to the material
world. True reality is the intelligible realm as opposed to the shadowy,
sensory world which is perpetually in flux:
For all things which vary according to place and time, and which are
subject to the corporeal senses, should not themselves be regarded as
truly substantial existents [res substantiales vereque existentes] but as tran-
sitory images and verifications [quaedam transitoriae imagines et resultatio-
nes] derived therefrom. We may take as an illustration of this the voice
and its image which the Greeks call echo; or bodies and the shadows
[umbrae] which they throw either in the pure air or in water or in any
other medium capable of producing them. All such can be shown to be
not themselves real, but false images [falsae imagines] of the real. So just
as the echoes of voices and the shadows of bodies do not subsist of
themselves because they are not substances [quia substantia non sunt];
neither can sensible bodies, which are an image of substantial things,
subsist of themselves [per se subsistere]. (Periphyseon V.914a)
The truly real things are the eternal ousiai, which have per se subsistence
and are incorporeal and eternal. In Periphyseon book I, Eriugena distin-
guished five ways of speaking about being and non-being. The fourth mode
expresses this Platonism:
The fourth mode is that which, not improbably according to the phi-
losophers, declares that only those things which are contemplated by
30. The Periphyseon is here cited according to the following editions: I. P.
Sheldon-Williams, ed., Iohannis Scotti Eriugenae Periphyseon (De Divisione Naturae),
book one (Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies, 1968), book two (Dublin,
1970), book three, with John O’Meara (Dublin, 1981). For book four I have used
the new edition of E. Jeauneau (Dublin: Dublin Institute for Advanced Studies,
1995). For book five I have used the Latin text of Patrologia Latina Vol. 122 and the
English translation of I. P. Sheldon-Williams and J. J. O’Meara, published in J. J.
O’Meara, ed., Eriugena. Periphyseon (Dumbarton Oaks/Montréal: Bellarmin, 1987).
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the intellect alone [solo intellectu] truly are [vere esse], while those things
which in generation, through the expansions or contractions of matter,
and the intervals of places and motions of times are changed, brought
together, or dissolved, are said not to be truly [vere non esse], as is the
case with all bodies which can come into being and pass away. (Peri.
I.445b–c)
Only those things contemplated by the intellect alone truly are, whereas
mutating things in space and time are not. True being belongs to the
intelligible world of timeless essences or ousiai. These substances are incor-
poreal: “ousia is incorporeal and the object of no sense” (Peri. I.478d).
Furthermore, Eriugena, adhering to the move made by Philo and Plotinus,
locates these first substances or ousiai in the divine mind.
Crucially, the primary ousiai are not just ‘intelligible’ (intelligibilis), they
are also ‘intellectual’ (intellectualis), that is, they are united with mind so as
themselves  to  possess intelligence  in some  way. Perhaps because of its
obscurity, this claim has been neglected by commentators. The precise
manner of their intellectual status is not clear, but, in general Neoplatonic
terms, involves a close reconciliation of subjective and objective states. It
requires that the higher ontological principles are not only intelligible (that
is, can be penetrated by mind), but that they are also intellectual (they act
as minds)—a claim developed by Plotinus Ennead V.3 and Augustine, De
Genesi ad litteram XII.10.21. The Neoplatonic hierarchical scale of reality
requires that all things be subsumed into the categories of life and intellect,
before becoming one with the One. This is deeply Neoplatonic, and also,
of course, deeply Christian.
The key to Eriugena’s metaphysical outlook is that creation is modeled
on divine self-intellection. Eriugena understands God as a transcendent
nothingness or non-being “above all that is and is not,” whose first act is his
own self-explication or creation, his moving from superessential non-being
into manifest being. Thus in Periphyseon book III Eriugena repeats the
notion that the divine nature creates itself:
the divine nature is seen to be created and to create—for it is created
by itself in the primordial causes [creatur enim a se ipsa in primordialibus
causis], and therefore creates itself [ac per hoc se ipsum creat], that is,
allows itself to appear in its theophanies, willing to emerge from the
most hidden recesses of its nature in which it is unknown even to itself,
that is, it knows itself in nothing [in nullo se cognoscit] because it is
infinite and supernatural and superessential and beyond everything
that can and cannot be understood; but descending into the principles
of things and, as it were, creating itself [ac veluti se ipsam creans], it
begins to know itself in something. (Peri. III.689a–b)
God creates himself by manifesting himself in being. Creation is in fact
defined as ‘manifestation in another’ (creatio, hoc est in aliquo manifestatio
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I.455b), which in this case means manifestation of oneself in another. God’s
self-creation is his self-externalization, his overcoming of his own transcen-
dent darkness to become the principle of being and of light. God’s self-crea-
tion gives rise to God’s self-knowing, and likewise it is God’s self-knowing
which generates his manifest being. While the divine self-creation is itself
not an explicitly idealist thesis, it is expressed in Eriugena in idealist terms,
terms adapted from Saint Augustine’s account of self-knowledge: the move
from non-being to being is a movement which the mind itself makes when
it creates itself in its attempt to come to self-knowledge.
God’s self-creation is one with the creation of all things other than God.
Creation as a whole and the actual being of all things is a product of the
willings of the divine mind (theia thelemata, divinae voluntates, Peri. II.529b).
These willings are divine apparitions or theophanies. Eriugena constantly
cites Dionysius’s Celestial Hierarchy chap. iv. 1 (PG III 177d) to the effect that
the “being of each thing is the superbeing of the divinity” (esse omnium est
superesse divinitas, Peri. I.443b). God’s being is the essence of all things. The
true nature of all things is their immaterial essence in the divine nature.
Reality is the self-manifestation of the divine thought. God is ‘all in all’ (I Cor.
15:28, Deus erit omnia in omnibus).
This divine intellect gathers the ideas and seeds of all things in itself.
The individual nature and substances of things (ousiai, substantiae) are their
ideas which are contained in the perfect mind of God understood as Logos
or verbum. But Eriugena makes it clear that humans and angels can share in
and be one with the divine Logos. Human knowledge is in fact the knowing
of things in the mind of God. In so far as it has knowledge, the human mind
participates in this divine intellection. In its ideal unfallen state, it is identi-
cal with the divine mind, and manifest reality is in fact co-produced by the
human and divine minds acting together. Creation is theophany, and theo-
phany is revelation to minds.
ERIUGENA’S CONCEPT OF SUBJECTIVITY
In keeping with this dynamic cosmology, Eriugena has a developed concept
of subjectivity, one built around the idea of self-understanding as self-mani-
festation, understood in terms of the generation of multiple perspectives
or theoriae on infinite reality. This account of self-knowing combines aspects
of the thought of Augustine and Maximus Confessor. Eriugena’s resulting
cogito is radically existential; the mind knows its own existence even as it
cannot comprehend its own nature. Eriugena’s version of the cogito, ‘intel-
ligo me esse’ (Peri. I.490b) is deeply Augustinian; our mind, its self-knowledge
and its operations, are part of our being an imago dei, and specifically an
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imago Trinitatis.31 However, Eriugena offsets this Augustinian conception
of the mind’s knowledge of itself with Maximus’s conception of the mind’s
self-ignorance because of its transcendent, unbounded nature. Following
Maximus Confessor, Eriugena asserts that we always know that we are but
not what or who we are. Just as the divine mind does not know what it is
but only that it is (Peri. II.590c), the human mind too has both ignorance
and knowledge of itself. We can assert our own existence with absolute
certainty, but we cannot know our own essence.
The human mind defines all other things below it but it cannot define
itself or  any other subjectivity (Peri. I.484d). To  define  means  here  to
circumscribe, delimit, or comprehend. Human minds cannot comprehend
God since God is greater than the human mind. Similarly, the human self
cannot comprehend itself. To comprehend oneself would mean that one
was simultaneously the object and the subject of an act of comprehending.
In this state, the mind would both be completely circumscribed by itself,
and yet also be this circumscribing mind. Eriugena rules this out as impos-
sible. The self does not objectify itself in self-knowledge, rather it is identical
with itself and its knowing is really a form of ignorance. The mind knows
infallibly only that it exists, for if it did not know, it would not exist. It grasps
its naked existence (esse or existentia) but not its own nature. The mind
knows itself immediately, but is not completely transparent to itself, not
through a defect but because non-objectifiable subjectivity is ontologically
higher than objecthood.
Eriugena uses the terms nous, intellectus, animus, spiritus (II.574b) to
refer to mind. Furthermore, although he differentiates between the divine,
angelic, and human minds, he more usually speaks, in typical Neoplatonic
manner, of ‘mind’ in a general, undifferentiated way. For Eriugena, the
essence of human nature is pure mind. Just as God’s being is identical with
His actions (I.518a), so too Eriugena understands the mind to be identical
with its acts. We are identical with our acts of understanding: “for we ourselves
are not other than our intellects” (Non enim aliud sumus, aliud noster intellectus,
Peri. IV.780c). The mind has faculties or powers which Eriugena refers to in
traditional terms as ‘motions’: “For the essential being of the soul is not other
than her substantial motion’ [Non enim aliud est animae essentialiter esse et
substantialiter moveri]” (II.574b), here following Maximus’s Ambigua which
itself is repeating a Proclean and Plotinian tradition.
For nous and ousia denote the highest part of our nature [or rather its
highest motion. For as you yourself understand it is not one thing for
our nature to be and another thing for it to move.] . . . Therefore the
essence of our soul is the intellect which presides over the totality of
human nature. (Peri. II.570a–b)
31. See Brian Stock, “Intelligo me esse: Eriugena’s Cogito,” in R. Roques, ed., Jean
Scot Erigène et l’histoire de la philosophie (Paris: CNRS, 1977), pp. 327–34.
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There are three motions in the mind, referred to by the Greek terms nous,
logos, and dianoia (see II.570c); or, in Latin, intellectus, ratio, and sensus
interior: “For in that language [Greek] intellect is called nous, reason logos,
and sense dianoia; (but) this (does) not (mean) exterior but interior
(sense) (Peri. II. 569c).”
For Eriugena all three faculties belong to the essence of the soul or
mind, whereas exterior sense (Latin: sensus exterior, Greek aisthesis, II.569c)
is created by the mind as a kind of foil or wrapping, associated with the
possession of the body: “for when the body perishes and life departs it
(exterior sense) disappears entirely” (Peri. II.569a). Eriugena states that the
essence of human nature is the mind and its three operations, everything
else, body and the five senses is superadded as a result of the Fall.
Minds communicate with and contemplate one another in a mutual
recognition (per reciprocam cognitionem, IV.780b). Minds can enter into and
become the other in acts of understanding, but they can never encompass
or objectify the other. Thus when a man understands an angel he is made
in the angel in a certain way and vice-versa, as Eriugena states explicitly in
book IV:
If you look more closely into the mutual relation and unity [reciprocam
copulationem et unitatem] which exist between intelligible and rational
natures, you will  at  once find  that  not only  is  the angelic nature
established [constitutam] in the human but also the human is estab-
lished in the angelic. For it is created in everything of which the pure
intellect has the most perfect knowledge and becomes one with it . . .
Moreover the angel is made in man, through the understanding of
angel which is in man, and man is in the angel through the under-
standing of man which is established in the angel. For, as I have said
before, he who has pure understanding is created in that which he
understands. (Peri. IV.780a–b)
Earlier, Eriugena had explicitly confirmed that anything which is known by
the intellect or reason or sense can be created and brought about (creari et
effici, IV.765c) in the knower. To understand something, then, is to be able
to create that entity in oneself, to have a species of it in the mind. Eriugena
follows Augustine’s De Trinitate IX.11.16 in holding that the incorporeal
species in the mind are of a higher nature than the species found in the
bodies (IV.766a–b). As Augustine says and Eriugena repeats: “Melior est
tamen imaginatio corporis in animo quam illa species corporis, in quantum haec in
meliore natura est, id est in substantia vitali, sicut est animus” (De Trinitate
IX.11.16, quoted at Peri. IV.766a). Furthermore, Eriugena argues that
things really are identical with their intelligible essences grasped in the
perfect understanding (which both human and divine mind possess). The
real ousiai of things are spiritual and immaterial and mental. How then do
we explain the apperance of materiality? The external characteristics of
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things are merely a conglomeration of accidents that come together to form
what appear to be visible, corporeal bodies. Qualities which are themselves
eternal, invisible, and incorporeal come together to give the appearance of
corporeality.
For by the action of the soul, which cements together [conglutinante] the
incorporeal qualities [and] takes [from quantity] as it were a kind of
substrate [for these qualities] and places it under (them), it creates for
itself [corpus sibi creat] a body in which she may openly display her hidden
actions (which) in themselves (are) invisible, and bring (them) forth
into sensible knowledge [inque sensibilem notionem]. (Peri. II.580.a–b)
Here Eriugena very clearly states that soul itself ‘creates’ (creat) the body.
Although elsewhere he says that the soul ‘made’ (fecit) the body, like Augus-
tine,  Eriugena frequently  employs the  verb ‘facere’ as  synonymous with
‘creare’. Eriugena will claim that the mind ‘creates’ the body in the sense of
manufacturing it:
we do not doubt but that the trinity of our nature, . . . is not only
created out of nothing but also creates the senses which are subjoined
to it, and the instruments of the senses, and the whole of its body—I
mean this mortal (body). For (the created trinity) is made from God in
the image of God out of nothing, but its body it creates [itself], though
not out of nothing but out of something. (Peri. II.580a–b)
It is true that Eriugena also speaks of God as creating the human body,
but he understands this almost as a kind of coincident occasionalism: God
acts and the human mind acts. Both the human and divine minds share the
same act of  self-externalization  whereby  minds themselves generate or
create their own bodies. The mind’s extrusion of the body from itself is not
ex nihilo creation, but involves bringing to light what was hidden. The
material from which the mind makes the body is not matter but qualities
and quantities it finds within its own intellectual nature. Furthermore, we
have bodies, but we are not identical with those bodies:
We are our substance, which is endowed with life and intellect [beyond
our body and all its senses and its visible form]. Ours but not our own
self, is the body which is attached to us and composed of a quantum
and a quale and the other accidents, and is sensible [mutable, dissol-
uble, corruptible]. (Peri. I.497c)
Surely this passage is sufficient testimony, contra Burnyeat, that the
human body had been externalized to a mere object in the world. The body
and the lower functions have been added to our essence as a result of sin
(571d) but do not belong essentially to us. The body, then, is a product of
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mind and depends on a certain (fallen) mental outlook. Even if God is seen
as creator of the body, it is because God anticipates this mental outlook.
God and the mind then create the body, but furthermore, as we shall see,
the mind creates itself.
THE MIND CREATES ITSELF
As we have seen, the mind knows that it is, and for Eriugena, this self-knowing
is a form of self-manifestation. This self-manifestation of the mind parallels
that of the Godhead which manifests itself through the divisions of nature.
The Godhead too is both unmanifest and manifest, uncreated and created.
God is initially hidden in the highest darkness but he manifests himself in all
things as those things themselves, Eriugena states forcefully in book III:
It follows that we ought not to understand God and the creature as two
things distinct from one another, but as one and the same. For both the
creature, by subsisting, is in God; and God, by manifesting Himself, in
a marvellous and ineffable manner creates Himself in the creature, the
invisible making itself visible and the infinite finite and the uncir-
cumscribed circumscribed and the supratemporal temporal. (Peri.
III.678c ff)
Just as God creates by self-manifesting in things, so too the mind
creates itself by its own self-manifestation. Here, Eriugena uses the Augus-
tinian idea that the mind gives birth to its own understanding:
For the human mind begets (gignit) from itself as a kind of offspring of
itself the knowledge by which it knows itself, and the knowledge of itself
is equal to itself because it knows itself as a whole. (Peri. II.603b)
The mind then, for Eriugena, in a certain sense, creates itself. Its self-crea-
tion allows it to move from a kind of hidden non-being to a manifest being
where it signifies itself in signs and words. Moreover, just as God’s self-crea-
tion is thought as the creation of all things, so also the mind’s self-creation
gives the mind a knowledge of all things.
THE MIND CONTAINS THE ESSENCES OF ALL THINGS
The mind contains the logoi of all things. For Eriugena, mind is considered
to be ‘higher’ (altior) than, and consequently ‘better than’ (melior), material,
corporeal, sensible reality. There are several reasons adduced: (1) “that
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which understands is better than that which is understood” (IV.766b); (2)
“that which contains is one thing and that which is contained is another”
(I.478b); (3) what knows is, generally speaking, greater than what is known.
According to Augustine and Eriugena, as we have seen, the mental idea or
image (phantasia) of a thing is better than that thing itself, since it is
immaterial and mental and belongs to the mind’s vital substance. The
species or fantasm in the mind is of a superior nature to any body since it
is made of living mental substance. When the mind understands something,
it possesses the species or fantasms of those things in itself, and there in the
mind they possess mental substance and are in a way identical with the mind
itself. The mind possessing  knowledge  of  things  is also  possessing the
spiritual essences of those things. This is why Eriugena lays such a stress on
the mind as containing the knowledge or definitions of all things.
Furthermore, Eriugena explicitly says, following Plotinus, that, at the
level of intellectus, knower and known are one, the understanding of all things
constitutes the essence of all things, for example: “the intellection of all
things is the being of all things [intellectus enim omnium essentia omnium est]”
(II.559ab; see also II.535cd; III.632d; IV.786b). Thus, not only does the mind
know all things, but this knowing of all things is the very being of those things.
Eriugena often cites this from Dionysius: “the knowledge of the things that
are is the things that are [cognitio eorum quae sunt ea quae sunt est]” (II.559b).
Of course, it is traditional to invoke the verbum, or Christ, as the container of
all things. Thus, in Eriugena, Christ’s knowledge of things is said to be the
knowledge of things: “Christ who understands all things is the understanding
of all things” (Christus qui omnia intelligit, immo est omnium intellectus, II.545a).
Christ is the form of all intelligible life (forma omnis intellectualis vitae, II.548c),
and in him are hidden the storehouses of the knowledge and wisdom of all
things (in quo sunt thesauri  scientiae sapientiaeque absconditi,  Peri. V.864c;
V.981c). Indeed, Christ’s knowledge of things constitutes their being, since
God’s knowing is His willing and His willing is His making, for God there is no
separate action required to create: “For the understanding of all things God
is the essence of all things” (Peri. II.559b). God’s self-manifestation as the verbum
is at the same time the creation or ‘eruption’ (Peri. II.540a23, erumperet) of all
things in the verbum, and the verbum itself has complete knowledge of and
identity with the beings which are created in it.
In relation to the possession of this knowledge of things, however,
Eriugena does not make a distinction between an eternal divinity and
temporal humanity of Christ. The two are eternally conjoined. Christ is
essentially, and hence eternally, both God and man: “Christ was both in
paradise and at the same time in the world” (Peri. II.539c). His humanity
is timeless and placeless, and is not located in a corporeal, sexed body but
in a spiritual, sexless body.32 Christ is both a perfect human (“the perfec-
32. Eriugena clearly thinks of the post-resurrection body as a spiritual entity
rather than as a sexual, corporeal body, see II.539a.
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tion of man is Christ,” II.541c, vir autem perfectus est Christus, IV.743b8–9),
and also exemplifies the essence of the whole of humanity in that the
whole of humanity and all other things too are consummated in Him (in
quo omnia consummata sunt, IV.743b9). It is therefore clear that, for Eri-
ugena, the human intellect of Christ—and not just the divine intellect—
knows all things, “for to the human intellect which Christ assumed all the
intellectual essences adhere” (Humano enim intellectui quem Christus assump-
sit omnes intellectuales essentiae inseparabiliter adhaerent, II.542a).33 The time-
less essence of humanity, perfect human mind as exemplified by Christ
and identical with Him, remains a temporal possibility for fallen humans.
In its true timeless essence, human nature knows all things and contains
in itself the knowledge of all things. The knowledge of each thing is its
essential definition and for Eriugena that is identical with the essence of
the thing itself.
It is clear from such passages that Eriugena is maintaining that the
essences of all things are to be found not only in the divine but also in the
human mind. It might be argued that Eriugena is referring only to the
essences existing in the divine mind, and thus read Eriugena as utterly
traditional and orthodox, as always recognizing the unbridgable gulf be-
tween human and divine reality.34 However, this objection neglects Eri-
ugena’s emphasis on the timeless identity of Christ’s humanity and divinity.
In the divine plan, human nature itself will be deified and unified with the
Godhead; to put it more accurately, human nature is already timelessly one
with the Godhead but humans through willful ignorance do not under-
stand this and mistake the accretions which they have added to perfect
human nature to be the true human nature whereas it is really a false cloak
hiding the true nature.
For Eriugena, paradise is not a place but is perfected human nature.
There never was a time when humans were in paradise, nor will there be
a time when they return, but time itself is the fallen condition from which
right intellectual understanding liberates us. While this is rather difficult
to articulate, it is clearly at the core of Eriugena’s concerns. Paradise and
the inhabited globe have one and the same ratio (Peri. II.538b34). The
unification of the whole of creation would have taken place in man had
he not sinned (Peri. II.537c). Now it takes place in Christ who after the
resurrection is pure essence of humanity, no longer male or female
(II.537d). Christ ‘recapitulates’ the whole of nature, he reunites and dis-
33. This is added to Rheims. Here, he is strongly influenced by Maximus.
Michael Strasser has questioned the meaning of Eriugena’s use of ‘adhaerent’ here,
pointing out that Eriugena usually uses it to refer to the manner in which accidents
or qualities cluster around their subject.
34. See Michael Strasser’s review of Dermot Moran, Philosophy of John Scottus
Eriugena, Nous 26 (1992): 509–13, where he argues (p. 512) that the reference to all
things being in Christ refers to all things being ‘in God’.
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solves the oppositions of male and female, soul and body, earth and
heaven.35 For Eriugena, developing Maximus’s statement, “God and man
are paradigms of each other.” God manifests himself in man, and the very
essence of human nature is to be one with God, and the very best humans
will be deified in theosis with God.
Eriugena’s definition of human nature is thoroughly idealist, rejecting
the common medieval understanding of human beings as microcosms or
as rational animals. Rather: “man is a certain notion eternally made in the
mind of God [homo est notio quaedam intellectualis in mente divina aeternaliter
facta]” (Peri. IV.768b).36 Man is an idea in the mind of God. In like manner,
all things are ideas in God’s mind. This definition of human nature is
most puzzling since it does not appear to individuate humans from any
other created thing whose idea is also contained in the divine mind. The
definition of human nature does not more than point out that a human
being both contains all things and somehow mirrors the divine nature
exactly.
The perfect human mind in a certain way remains unfallen, as for
Plotinus. That is, Mind in itself remains in communion with the One.
Rather than itself falling into imperfection, the mind is clouded around
with the fantasies of sense and cannot reach itself, as it were, until it
engages in philosophical theoria and begins the return to itself. Humans
have the possibility of a duplex theoria—seeing things temporally or eter-
nally, carnally or spiritually, materially or mentally. Only the eternal, spiri-
tual intellectual vision is truly real. The other theoria is nothing but a private
phantasia.
Furthermore, if  humans had not  fallen  they would  rule over this
creation in the manner in which God does.
For if man had not sinned he would not be ruled among the parts of
the universe [inter partes mundi] but would himself rule the whole of it
as his subject: and he would not employ for that purpose these corpo-
real senses of the mortal body, but would govern eternally and fault-
lessly the whole and the parts of it in accordance with the laws of God,
without any physical act in space or time, but solely by the rational
apprehension of its natural and innate causes and by the easy use of
35. See Carlos Steel, “Lost Simplicity: Eriugena on Sexual Difference,” in
Mediaevalia, Textos e Estudos, 7–8 (1995): 103–26, and E. Jeauneau, “La division des
sexes chez Grégoire de Nysse et chez Jean Scot Erigène,” in Beierwaltes, ed.,
Eriugena. Studien zu seinen Quellen (Heidelberg: Carl Winter Universitäts verlag,
1980), pp. 33–54.
36. See Dermot Moran, “Officina omnium or notio quaedam intellectualis in mente
divina aeternaliter facta: the Problem of the Definition of Man in the Philosophy of
John Scottus Eriugena,” in C. Wenin, ed., L’Homme et son univers au Moyen Age, 2 vols.
(Louvain-la-Neuve: Editions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1986),
1:195–204.
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right will [solo rationabili contuitu naturalium et interiorum eius causarum,
facillimo rectae voluntatis usu]. (Peri. IV. 782b16–c24)
CORPOREAL BODIES ARE ACTUALLY IMMATERIAL
AND INCORPOREAL
Eriugena, following late antique thought, conceives of the physical world as
bounded by the categories as given in the Aristotelian tradition.37 Just as the
human corporeal body is really a concatenation of accidents, all other
corporeal things are similarly produced by a commingling of quantity,
quality, and  the  other  accidents,  gathered  around  the original unseen
essence (Peri. I.495d–96a). Furthermore, Eriugena says ousia or substance is
unknowable in itself and is known by its circumstantiae (Peri. I.471b34),
circunstantes (I.471c7), or periocai, periokhai. These are not strictly speaking
accidents—because they are ‘outside’ (extrinsecus) the essence, and yet they
cannot exist apart from it. Not only is ousia unknowable in itself, but, at Peri.
I.478c, Eriugena says that none of the categories is accessible to sense. Ousia
itself transcends the senses and the other categories are either in or around
ousia so that they also in themselves are not known to the senses. The
argument is simple, if ousia is incorporeal, then its accidents must also be
incorporeal since they inhere in it or stand around it:
You are aware, I think, of the fact that none of the aforesaid ten
categories which Aristotle defined, when thought of by itself, that is, in
its own nature, in the light of reason, is accessible to the bodily senses.
For ousia is incorporeal and the object of no sense, while the other nine
categories are about it or within it. But if the former is incorporeal,
surely it must be apparent to you that everything which is either at-
tached to it or subsists in it [omnia quae aut ei adhaerent aut in ea
subsistunt] and cannot exist apart from it is incorporeal? Therefore all
the categories are incorporeal when considered in themselves. (Peri.
I.478c)
Eriugena goes on to explain that some of these categories ‘commingle’ (the
term he uses is coitus) with one another to produce the effect of corporeality.
Some of them, however, by a certain marvelous commingling with one
another [earum tamen [quaedam] inter se mirabili quodam coitu], as Gre-
37. For a fuller account of Eriugena’s conception of the physical world, see
Dermot Moran, “Time, Space and Matter in the Periphyseon: An Examination of
Eriugena’s Understanding of the Physical World,” in F. O’Rourke, At the Heart of the
Real. Philosophical Essays in Honour of Archbishop Desmond Connell (Dublin: Irish
Academic Press, 1992), pp. 67–96.
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gory says, produce visible matter, while some appear in nothing [in
nullo apparent] and remain for ever incorporeal. For ousia and relation,
place, time, action, passion are not reached by any bodily sense, while
quantity and quality, situation and condition, when they come together
and constitute matter, as we said just now, are normally perceived by
bodily sense. (Peri. I.479a)
Eriugena, then, sees not just human bodies but all material bodies as
made up of a congruence (concursus, confluxus, coitus) of accidents.38 Mate-
riality is understood in terms of accidents clustering around a primary
accident, quantity, but the key idea is not that matter is res extensa, but that
it is sensuously grasped, it appears as sensible. Here, Eriugena is drawing on
Gregory of Nyssa, who, in his De hominis opificio, chapter xxiv (PL
XLIV.212d), argued for the immateriality of bodies.39 When we think of a
body, according to Gregory, we can formulate different ideas about it—that
it is two cubits long, heavy, etc., these ideas can be separated from the body
itself and from each other. When they are all removed no subject of predi-
cation, no hypokeimenon is left.40 Each of the qualities on its own is grasped
as an intellectual idea that is incorporeal (we can for example distinguish
the idea of color from the idea of weight). For Gregory, these qualities are
ideas independent of one another and independent of any substratum, it is
only when thought together that we get the idea of materiality. When all the
ideas are withdrawn, the idea of body itself dissolves. Presumably, Gregory
inherited this idea from Plotinus who, in Ennead VI.3.8, argued that sensible
38. The terms he gives to this congruence are varied: concursus (Peri. I.498b23,
I.503a4), contemeratus coitus (I.498b26–7), armonia (I.501b9), confluxus (III.713c19),
conventus (III.714a31), synodus (III.714a33). The most generally occuring terms are
concursus and coitus (e.g. III.712b7). Eriugena is committed to the view that all
nature acts harmoniously, so this coming together of qualities to form bodies is not
chaotic or disordered. Many of Eriugena’s terms suggest an analogy with the sexual
act. Through an act of congress, things are produced. This notion would reappear
in later writings of the medieval alchemists.
39. There is a similar idealistic passage in Gregory’s De anima et eius resurrec-
tione, which however appears to have been unknown to Eriugena. See M. Cappuyns,
“Le De imagine de Grégoire de Nysse traduit par Jean Scot Erigène,” Recherches de
théologie ancienne et médiévale 32 (1965): 205–62. See also, Philip Levine, “Two Early
Latin Versions of St. Gregory of Nyssa’s peri kataskeues anthropou,” Harvard Studies in
Classical Philology 63 (1958): 473–92. This work, which bears the Greek title Peri
Kataskeues Anthropou, was written in 379 to supplement his brother Basil’s Hexae-
meron, and gives an account of the creation of man on the Sixth Day. It was an
important work and was translated into Latin four times between the sixth and the
sixteenth century, the earliest translation being that of Dionysius Exiguus who
entitled it De conditione hominis, whereas Eriugena called it De imagine. It is translated
by W. Moore and H.A. Wilson in Gregory of Nyssa. Selected Works and Letters, The
Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers Vol. 5 (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Erdmans, 1972), pp.
387–427. A new Greek edition of Gregory of Nyssa’s text is in preparation by Carlos
Steel of the University of Leuven.
40. R. Sorabji, Matter, Space and Motion, p. 53.
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substances are a mere ‘conglomeration’ (sumphoresis) of matter and quali-
ties. Matter is understood not as a real principle but as “a shadow upon a
shadow, a picture and an appearance.”41 Matter is appearance to sensibility.
Plotinus in this passage is an immaterialist, but, more importantly, the
Christians who read him were able to import this theory into their system
without leaving any residue of matter as any kind of second principle, as in
Plato’s indefinite dyad. Eriugena explains that the ex nihilo out of which
things are made is really God himself, ex nihilo means ex Deo. God is the sole
source of all things and all things are really identical with their immaterial
eternal ideas in God’s mind. This is an extremely radical idealism.
PLACE AND TIME ARE IN THE MIND
Finally, let us look briefly at two of the ten categories, the categories of place
and time, since these are crucial to understanding the manner in which the
physical world is constituted by mind in Eriugena. Eriugena’s theories on
place and time, moreover, attracted the attention of the early German Ideal-
ist commentators who, not unjustly, compared Eriugena favorably with
Kant’s transcendental idealist doctrine of space and time as the a priori pure
forms of sensible intuition. Eriugena argues that place is definition and
definition is in the mind, therefore place is in the mind. Aristotle in Physics
book 4 chapter 4 (212A20) defined place as “the primary motionless bound-
ary of that which contains.” For Aristotle, place is the inner containing
surface by which one body enfolds another body, and Eriugena agrees with
Aristotle: “place is nothing else but the boundary by which each thing is
enclosed within fixed terms [Nil aliud est locus nisi ambitus quo unumquodque
certis terminis concluditur]” (Peri. I.474b). Place is boundary, that is, definition:
“place is constituted in the definitions of things that can be defined” (Peri.
I.474b). Knowledge aspires to definition. The definitions of all things are
contained in the knowledge (scientia) of the liberal arts; therefore, the liberal
arts are the places of things which can be defined. All things find their place
in the arts. Eriugena concludes from this that place is in the mind, since the
arts are in the mind. His argument proceeds as follows:
(1) “What contains is other than what is contained [Aliud est enim
quod continet et aliud quod continetur]” (Peri. I.478b26–7).
(2) “Bodies are contained in their places, therefore place is not a
body [Corpora continentur locis suis; aliud igitur est corpus et aliud
41. See R. Sorabji, “Bodies as Bundles of Properties,” Matter, Space and Motion,
p. 51. See Plotinus, Ennead VI.3.8, 19–37. The term sumphoresis itself comes from
Epicurus.
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locus]” (Peri. I.478c27–29). That is, body belongs in the category of
quantity, whereas definition is in that of place.
(3) “Place is definition [locus omnis quia diffinitio est]” (Peri.
I.475b17).
(4) “Definition exists in art and every art is in the mind [Si enim
diffinitio omnis in disciplina est et omnis disciplina in animo, necessario
locus  omnis, quia diffinitio est, non alibi nisi in animo erit]” (Peri.
I.475b15–17).
(5) “Place exists only in the mind [non erit nisi in animo]” (Peri.
I.475b17).
Actually Eriugena is running together several claims: (1) definition
involves placing a thing in the sense of locating it in the fixed scheme of
science, from which he draws the conclusion that (2) definition is place. He
then makes the more problematic statement that since place is definition,
and definition is in the mind then place is in the mind. Eriugena is hereby
extending to the concept of place what Augustine and Plotinus say of
time—that it exists ‘in the mind’ (in animo), and that it is through it that the
mind measures things. The true place of everything is its essential defini-
tion, which is changeless and which as a logos or rationale is preserved in
the mind. Whose mind? Clearly, Eriugena means the human mind, since he
has just been talking about the liberal arts as containing the definitions of
all things. The human mind has the power to define, hence all things which
it defines are set in their proper places. Of course, the human mind, since
it transcends definition and place, cannot define itself, and hence it is
located in no place. Furthermore, since the Word is the true knowledge
(cognitio) of all things, then the true definitions are contained in the Word,
but there is no suggestion that the human self which contains the knowl-
edge of all the arts is any less omniscient than the Word, indeed Eriugena
explicitly says that perfect human nature is omniscient.
CONCLUSION
In this article, I believe I have amply demonstrated that idealism did exist,
indeed flourished, before modernity, and that Eriugena is an idealist in
several senses of that term. Indeed, Eriugena is an idealist both in the
Berkeleian immaterialist sense and also in the more developed sense of
German Idealism. Eriugena has a sophisticated and developed concept of
a self-aware and self-productive subjectivity, a pure mind that is a subject
(subiectum) that both comprehends all things below it. Furthermore, the
mind is actually responsible for the creation of the human material body
and also for the apparent corporeality of all material things. But, the key
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point is that Eriugena is an idealist for Christian Neoplatonist reasons, that
is, he wanted to do justice to the understanding of creation according to the
principle that like comes from like, and he wanted to think through the
proximity between the human and the divine minds in terms of the dynam-
ics of self-knowledge. From Gregory of Nyssa, Eriugena emphasizes that the
corrupting temporal flow and apparent restricting spaces of this world are
not part of God’s original design, but are forced on our human world
through the self-ignorance that constituted the Fall. Furthermore, in the
manner in which Eriugena thinks of reality as constituted by communicat-
ing minds, both divine and human, he is articulating an insight which
becomes fully developed in Hegelian idealism: the primacy of self-
consciousness. A more general consequence of these investigations is that
we are required to rethink the dawn of subjectivity in philosophy normally
assumed to begin with Descartes, leading to a reevaluation of the medieval
concept of mind. A corollary is that idealism arising from considerations of
the meaning of creation may be intimately linked with theism (a position
Hegel affirmed), and those who want to distinguish theism from idealism
must reconsider the nature of the act of creation.
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